Five Fraud Controls Every Organisation Should...
Fraud risks continue to evolve, but many of the most effective controls remain practical and straightforward. This article looks at...
Read MoreFor many organisations, Microsoft 365 is no longer simply a collection of productivity applications. It has become a substantial part of the workplace itself. Email runs through Outlook and Exchange Online. Internal conversations and meetings take place in Teams. Documents are stored in SharePoint and OneDrive. Procedures, contact lists, project information and business records may all sit within the same Microsoft environment.
That dependence became particularly visible on 12 and 13 November 2026, when a major global Microsoft 365 outage disrupted organisations around the world for more than 12 hours. Outlook, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive, Copilot and other Microsoft 365 services experienced disruption, with governments, healthcare providers, schools, police forces, airlines, financial institutions and businesses among those affected.
Microsoft said it had found no evidence of malicious activity and began gradually restoring capacity after servers unexpectedly became unavailable and the remaining infrastructure came under increased load.
The incident provides a useful reminder that business continuity does not begin and end with backups or disaster recovery. If the applications an organisation uses to communicate, collaborate, store documents and coordinate its response become unavailable at the same time, the question becomes much simpler: can the business still function without Microsoft 365?
The disruption began on the evening of 12 November and quickly spread across Microsoft 365 services globally. Microsoft reported particular problems with functionality dependent on Exchange Online, while users also reported difficulties accessing Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive and other services.
At the height of the incident, outage monitoring services recorded almost 130,000 reports across 74 countries. Microsoft said servers responsible for delivering Microsoft 365 services had unexpectedly become unavailable following automated checks. This placed additional pressure on the remaining infrastructure, contributing to further connectivity problems.
Microsoft said there was no indication that the disruption resulted from a cyberattack. By the morning of 13 November, the company was reporting improved server stability, although capacity and service reliability had not yet fully returned to normal.
The disruption quickly became more than a technical problem. UK police forces reported difficulties receiving online crime reports and redirected people towards telephone services. NHS organisations experienced problems with Outlook and Teams, including disruption to email communications and some remote services. Schools asked parents to telephone instead of emailing, while organisations overseas turned to alternative communication methods, including phone calls, paper processes and even fax.
These are all examples of business continuity arrangements being tested in the real world.
An outage affecting one application is relatively easy to understand. If email becomes unavailable, an organisation might decide to use Teams instead.
The problem becomes more complicated when several supposedly separate ways of working depend on the same underlying environment.
Microsoft 365 can provide email, messaging, videoconferencing, document management, file storage, collaborative working, calendars and increasingly AI-assisted services. Organisations may therefore have several different applications but relatively little genuine independence between them.
Having two communication applications does not necessarily mean an organisation has two independent communication methods. If both rely on the same underlying services, identity infrastructure or provider, the same incident may affect both.
The same principle applies beyond Microsoft. Two internet connections may rely on the same physical infrastructure. Two software providers may operate from the same cloud platform. A secondary application may depend on the same identity provider as the primary system.
Effective continuity planning therefore requires organisations to understand dependencies, rather than simply count how many applications they have.
The lesson from the outage is not that organisations should abandon Microsoft or duplicate every service with a competing provider. It is that no critical provider should be assumed to have perfect availability.
One of the more ironic weaknesses an organisation can discover during an outage is that its carefully documented business continuity plan is inaccessible because it is stored inside the system that has failed.
For many businesses, SharePoint is the natural home for policies and procedures. That may include the business continuity plan, incident response procedures, emergency contact information, supplier details, cyber-insurance information, communications templates, escalation routes and disaster recovery documentation.
Under normal circumstances, centralising those documents makes sense. It provides version control, controlled access, collaboration and a clear location for employees to find information.
During a Microsoft 365 outage, however, that centralisation can become a dependency.
The NCSC recommends that organisations ensure incident response plans and the communication mechanisms they rely on remain available even when normal business systems are not. Its guidance also advises organisations to establish alternative secure communication channels and maintain offline copies of important contact information.
For organisations facing more severe threats, the NCSC goes further, recommending that important plans are stored in multiple locations and, where appropriate, maintained in hard copy so they cannot become unavailable, deleted or altered during an incident.
This does not mean organisations need to print every policy in the ISMS. It means the information required to manage an emergency should not depend entirely on the technology whose failure may create that emergency.
A controlled offline copy of essential procedures, emergency contacts, supplier details and escalation information can be relatively simple to maintain. The important point is that somebody is responsible for keeping it current.
If employees normally communicate through Outlook and Teams, the continuity plan needs to explain what happens when neither is reliable.
That does not necessarily mean maintaining a second enterprise collaboration suite permanently. The appropriate solution should reflect the organisation’s size, risk and complexity.
For a small business, mobile phone numbers, SMS, an emergency WhatsApp group or another independently hosted channel may provide sufficient resilience. A larger organisation, financial institution, healthcare provider or critical service may need considerably more formal arrangements.
What matters is independence.
A backup communication platform that uses the same single sign-on environment as the failed primary platform may itself become inaccessible. An emergency contact list stored only in SharePoint creates the same problem.
The FCA has also highlighted the importance of testing alternative communication arrangements. Stronger firms test what they would do when normal channels are unavailable and maintain alternative methods capable of supporting decision-making and customer communications during disruption.
It is not enough for a continuity plan to say an alternative channel exists. Testing establishes whether anyone can actually use it.
Microsoft said there was no evidence that the latest outage resulted from malicious activity.
From a business continuity perspective, that distinction is important but not decisive.
If an organisation cannot send email, the immediate operational problem is broadly the same whether the cause is ransomware, infrastructure failure, human error, a defective software update or an outage at a third-party provider.
The technical response may be completely different. The continuity requirement remains the same: how does the organisation operate while that capability is unavailable?
This is why continuity planning should avoid becoming too threat-specific.
Rather than developing separate plans for ransomware taking down email, a Microsoft outage, an internet failure or a configuration error, an organisation can plan for the outcome: corporate email is unavailable for 24 hours.
Employees then need to know how critical communications will continue, how customers will make contact, how decisions will be recorded and which activities can continue without the normal platform.
The NCSC recommends identifying critical services, understanding how long the organisation can operate without them and planning how those services can be maintained at an acceptable level during disruption.
The Microsoft outage produced several examples of organisations falling back to alternatives. Police forces directed people towards 101, schools told parents to telephone, NHS organisations maintained clinical activity using alternative communication processes, and some businesses reportedly relied on phone calls, paper procedures and fax.
Those workarounds demonstrate resilience, but they also highlight an important limitation: a manual alternative may be perfectly adequate for two hours and completely impractical for two days.
If an organisation normally receives thousands of requests electronically, redirecting every customer to a telephone line may overwhelm available staff. If employees move to paper records, those records eventually need to be reconciled with the restored system. If staff use alternative messaging applications, the organisation may create new information security and data protection risks.
The FCA has specifically warned firms against relying on manual workarounds without demonstrating that those arrangements are scalable and sustainable during severe disruption.
A workaround therefore needs more than a sentence in a continuity plan. It needs testing.
Microsoft is responsible for restoring Microsoft 365. The organisations using it remain responsible for dealing with the consequences while it is unavailable.
This is particularly significant for regulated organisations. FCA guidance requires firms to understand third-party dependencies supporting important business services and to manage the risks those providers create throughout the relationship.
The principle is equally relevant outside financial services.
Outsourcing technology does not outsource the impact of its failure.
Supplier due diligence therefore needs to include more than security questionnaires and certifications. Organisations should understand which critical activities depend on a supplier, what service failure would mean operationally and what arrangements exist if that supplier cannot provide the service.
The Microsoft outage provides a straightforward scenario organisations could use in their next continuity exercise:
At 09:00 on the next working day, employees discover that Outlook, Teams, SharePoint and OneDrive are unavailable. Microsoft cannot provide a reliable restoration time.
From there, the exercise does not need to become overly complicated.
The exercise should then continue long enough to establish whether the workaround remains practical.
One hour without Microsoft 365 may be irritating. One full working day can expose very different dependencies.
Microsoft 365 is not uniquely vulnerable to outages. Google, Amazon, telecommunications providers, payment networks and virtually every major technology platform have experienced disruption.
The lesson is not to abandon cloud services or attempt to duplicate every capability. It is to recognise dependency and plan accordingly.
Organisations need to know which critical services depend on Microsoft 365, which alternatives genuinely operate independently and whether the information needed to manage an incident remains available when ordinary systems do not.
The latest outage provides a particularly useful reminder because it affected the applications many organisations would instinctively turn to during another emergency.
So one question is worth asking:
If Microsoft 365 disappeared again tomorrow morning, could your employees still access the information they need to keep the business running?
If the answer is stored in SharePoint, there may already be a problem.
At AJC, we help organisations strengthen their business continuity and operational resilience so they are better prepared to respond when critical systems, suppliers or services become unavailable.
Our team can support organisations with business continuity reviews, dependency mapping, disaster recovery and incident response planning, and realistic scenario-based exercises designed to test whether existing arrangements will work in practice.
By identifying critical services, understanding the technology and suppliers they depend on, and testing alternative ways of working, organisations can build a clearer picture of their resilience and identify where improvements are needed.
You can also use our Business Continuity Checklist to review your current arrangements and identify any areas that may need strengthening.
Find out more about AJC’s risk and business continuity services or contact us on 020 7101 4861 or info@ajollyconsulting.co.uk if you think we can help.
Sources:
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/nov/13/microsoft-outage-outlook-teams-word-excel-reports
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/disruptive-cyber-attacks/preparing
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/actions-to-take-when-the-cyber-threat-is-heightened
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/outsourcing-and-operational-resilience
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